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INTRODUCTION 
The idea for this special issue first arose at the Fourth Workshop on Un- 
certainty in Artificial Intelligence (AI) held at Minneapolis, Minnesota, in July 
1988. Jim Bezdek, the editor-in-chief of this journal, asked us if we were will- 
ing to act as guest editors. We thought it was a great idea for two reasons: 
(1) There was (and still is) considerable interest in the AI community on the 
Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions, and (2) members of the AI com- 
munity seemed to like the basic premises of the belief function approach but 
were not quite sure how to use them in real applications. 
As first-time guest editors usually do, we made up an ambitious chedule, 
which has since slipped quite a bit. However, thanks to Jim Bezdek, we will 
still make the targeted 1990 publication date. 
A lot of our gratitude in making this issue a reality goes to the referees for 
their thorough reviews and prompt responses. We thank them by name at the 
end of this introduction. With their help, we accepted the papers by Tom Strat, 
Didier Dubois and Henri Prade, and Greg Provan--for inclusion here. In ad- 
dition, we invited Glenn Sharer and Judea Pearl to write position papers that 
would be published unrefereed. Both kindly consented to do so and, as this 
issue testifies, delivered on their promises. These two papers make significant 
contributions to the state of the art in belief function theory, semantics, and 
application. 
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The most comprehensive source on the theory of belief functions is still 
Shafer's 1976 monograph, A Mathematical Theory of Evidence [1]. How- 
ever, that work has little about interpretation, implementation, or computation, 
topics of great interest to AI researchers. Much has been written on these sub- 
jects over the fifteen years since the monograph appeared. In his paper in this 
issue, "Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Belief Functions," Shafer 
attempts to summarize his views on these subjects. As is evident from Pearl's 
article, which follows Shafer's in these pages, there is still considerable argu- 
ment about he correct interpretation f belief functions. Shafer's article should 
go a long way toward clarifying some of these issues. The bibliography of about 
140 articles will also be very useful to researchers on this subject. 
Pearl, in his paper "Reasoning with Belief Functions: An Analysis of Com- 
patibility," raises fundamental issues regarding the meaning and expressiveness 
of belief functions in three crucial reasoning tasks: (1) representation f incom- 
plete knowledge; (2) method for belief updating, and (3) evidence pooling. 
However, in light of other known viewpoints (Smets [2] and Shafer, this issue), 
we feel that these arguments are still inconclusive. For example, from a prag- 
matic standpoint, it is not clear whether the debate between "the reliability of 
evidence in making conclusions" interpretation (Shafer [3]; Shafer and Tver- 
sky [4]) and the "the probabilities of provability" interpretation (cf. Pearl and 
Provan, this issue) is really resolved. 
Undoubtedly, Pearl makes a number of good points, and it is very impor- 
tant that practitioners of belief functions demonstrate how the semantics or the 
ontology of belief functions apply to their particular problem-solving domain. 
We feel it is very important that the debate on the meaning and applicability of 
belief functions continue. Therefore, a forthcoming special issue of this journal 
will contain solicited responses to both Shafer's and Pearl's papers, and both 
Sharer and Pearl will have an opportunity to reply to them in that issue. 
Strat's paper is tided "Decision Analysis Using Belief Functions." As the 
title indicates, Strat generalizes Bayesian decision theory to situations where 
uncertainty is represented by a belief function instead of a probability distribu- 
tion. Strat provides a definition of an expected value of a belief function that is 
a convex combination of the upper expected value and a lower expected value. 
We note that Jaffray [5] has defined a similar expected value. The only differ- 
ence between Strat and Jaffray is that Strat assumes point-valued utilities and 
models uncertainty as belief functions whereas Jaffray models utilities as belief 
functions but assumes point-valued probabilities. Mathematically, the two are 
equivalent. 
Dubois and Prade's paper is tided "Consonant Approximations of Belief 
Functions." Consonant belief functions are of interest o fuzzy-set heorists 
because a membership function can be regarded as a consonant belief function. 
These authors describe two methods for approximating a belief function by a 
fuzzy set; inner approximation that provides an upper bound on beliefs and an 
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outer approximation that provides a lower bound on beliefs. This paper will 
help bridge some of the gap between the theories of belief functions and those 
of fuzzy sets. 
Provan's paper, "A Logic-Based Analysis of Dempster-Shafer Theory," de- 
velops an elaborate framework for linking DS theory with propositional logic 
by establishing correspondences between logical relations and set theory op- 
erations. This framework provides the basis for analysis of the computational 
complexity of the evidence combination mechanisms. Like Pearl [6] and Laskey 
and Lehner [7], Provan establishes a correspondence between the ATMS formal- 
ism and DS theory. A major contribution of this work is the link it establishes 
between logic and belief functions and, like Pearl ([6] and this issue), casts 
belief functions in the "probability of provability" framework. How useful this 
formulation will be in advancing belief unction applications remains to be seen. 
In our request for papers we said that our goal was to produce an outstanding 
issue that would be treasured by researchers in AI and allied disciplines. We 
hope we have accomplished our objectives. We would like to thank all authors 
who submitted papers for consideration for the special issue. Even though we 
were unable to accept them all, we hope the referees provided constructive 
feedback. Several of these papers merited publication and are likely to appear 
in regular issues of this journal. 
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